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INTRODUCTION

In Safe Banking, Professor Adam Levitin joins a venerable
tradition in the money and banking literature. That tradition,
called full reserve banking, has claimed a number of illustrious
supporters over the years, including Professors Irving Fisher,
Henry Simons, and Milton Friedman.i The basic idea of full reserve banking is seductive in its simplicity: "banks" should own
nothing but physical cash. Because a full reserve bank has no investments, it can suffer no investment losses. A run on such a
bank would be harmless, because the bank would never fail to
meet redemptions (barring any loss or theft of cash). The process
of bank money creation, familiar to any student of Economics 101,
would go away. Money creation would be exclusively a government affair; "banks" would be pass-through vehicles, true depositories of currency. Our elaborate system of prudential bank regulation and supervision would be needless.
If it seems too good to be true, that's because it is. Proponents
of full reserve banking have long run up against two principal objections-one of them surmountable, the other fatal. The surmountable objection has to do with "regulatory arbitrage," or
avoidance. Once "deposits" must be backed by physical currency,
the argument goes, nonbank financial institutions will create
close substitutes for deposits and thereby evade the full reserve
requirement. Levitin treats this issue in some detail, and he offers
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See generally Irving Fisher, 100% Money (City Printing 3d ed 1945). See also
Henry C. Simons, Economic Policy for a Free Society 62-65 (Chicago 1948); Milton
Friedman, A Programfor Monetary Stability 65-76 (Fordham 1960). While Friedman became more laissez-faire over time, he reiterated his support for full reserve banking in his
preface to the 1992 reprint. Milton Friedman, A Program for Monetary Stability vii-xii
(Fordham 1992).
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a rather optimistic answer: He thinks that deposit substitutes can
emerge on a large scale only with various forms of government
"facilitation."2 Remove such facilitation, he says, and the problem
is basically solved.3 For reasons described below in Part I, I do not
find this answer wholly convincing. The good news is that regulatory arbitrage can be dealt with through well-designed entry restriction laws, which have been a staple of banking law (not to
mention public utility law) for centuries. Levitin's full reserve
banking plan therefore can't be rejected on this score.
It is the second objection-what I will call fiscal-monetary entanglement-that poses the real problem for full reserve banking
proposals, including Levitin's. As I show below in Part II, full reserve banking would present daunting challenges for both fiscal
management and the administration of monetary policy. Unfortunately, Levitin's article has little to say about this topic. Others
before him have addressed the issue, but their answers are unsatisfying. While noble in intent-and despite their continuing allure-full reserve banking proposals do not offer a workable blueprint for financial reform.
I. REGULATORY ARBITRAGE AND "SHADOW" BANKING
Among the novelties of Professor Levitin's proposal is his
treatment of "shadow banking," by which he means the creation
of deposit substitutes "outside the bank regulatory system."4 "Existing 100% reserve proposals universally fail to address the problem of shadow banking," he writes.5 "[A]1l previous 100% reservebanking proposals have focused solely on regulation of
depositaries."6
This is a bit of an overstatement. Professors Simons and
Friedman each wrestled with the problem of deposit substitutes
under full reserve banking.7 Simons was particularly troubled by
the issue. He worried that the development of deposit substitutes
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90 (2016).
3 Id at 389-90.
4
Id at 359.
5 Id at 365.
6
Levitin, 83 U Chi L Rev at 416 (cited in note 2).
7 Professor Fisher recognized the problem but dismissed it. See William R. Allen,
n 21 (1993).
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"might render our drastic reform quite empty, nominal, and unsubstantial."8 Simons remarked that "[t]he whole problem which
we now associate with commercial banking might easily reappear
in other forms of financial arrangements."9 That such deposit substitutes "cannot serve as circulating medium is not decisively important," he wrote, "for they are an effective substitute medium
for purposes of cash balances." 10 Hence, "the problem of runs
would still be with us."" By 1936, Simons had concluded that the
full reserve plan, standing on its own, "would promise little but
evasion." 12 Friedman saw the problem, too, though he thought he
had a solution. Under his proposal, the government would pay
interest on the cash reserves held by full reserve banks, thereby
enabling them to offer superior terms to depositors. 13 Nonbanks
offering deposit substitutes would be unable to effectively
compete.
While Levitin isn't the first full reserve banking proponent to
grapple with deposit substitutes, he does offer an intriguing strategy for addressing the issue. In Levitin's view, deposit substitutes
owe their existence to government facilitation. Rather than being
an "organic development," he writes, "various shadow-banking
products, like all financial instruments, are legally constituted." 14
Levitin's point here is something more than the familiar notion
that markets depend on the legal infrastructure of property, contract, tort, and so on. The mechanisms for creating deposit substitutes (or "safe assets") are "qualitatively different" from these
background rules, he notes, "because of the product- and
institution-specific nature of the regulations" that go into safe asset production. 15 Levitin supplies an extensive catalogue of these
interventions-risk-based capital requirements, bankruptcy safe
harbors for repos and swaps, implicit government backstops for
various types of institutions and markets, special regulatory
treatment of asset-backed securities, regulatory exemptions for
8
Ronnie J. Phillips, The Chicago Plan & New Deal Banking Reform 68 (Sharpe
1995) (quoting a letter from Simons to Fisher dated January 19, 1934).
9 Id at 90 (quoting a letter from Simons to Fisher dated July 4, 1934).
10 Id (quoting a letter from Simons to Fisher dated July 4, 1934).
11 Id (quoting a letter from Simons to Fisher dated July 4, 1934).
12 Simons, Economic Policy for a Free Society at 173 n 17 (cited in note 1).
13 Friedman, A Programfor Monetary Stability at 73-74 (cited in note 1).
14 Levitin, 83 U Chi L Rev at 389 (cited in note 2).
15 Id. Levitin draws here on Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J Comp
Econ 315 (2013), and Anna Gelpern and Erik F. Gerding, Inside Safe Assets (unpublished
manuscript, Oct 5, 2015) (on file with author). See also generally Robert C. Hockett and
Saule T. Omarova, The FinanceFranchise, 102 Cornell L Rev (forthcoming 2017), archived
at http://perma.cc/L6ZH-KAW9.
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money market mutual funds that allow them to maintain stable
net asset values, and so forth-and notes that their existence "is
essential to the vitality and size of the shadow-banking system." 16
Without them, "the shadow-banking market would assuredly be
substantially smaller." 17
But how much smaller? It is one thing to say that the government, through various "product- and institution-specific" mechanisms, facilitates the creation of deposit substitutes.18 It is quite

another to say that, absent those mechanisms, deposit substitutes
would wither away or at least shrink to the point of no longer posing a threat to financial stability.
There seems to be no reason in principle to think that the
business model in question-funding financial asset portfolios
with lots of short-term debt, continuously rolled over-can't be established using just the basic tools of property, contract, business
organizations, and commercial law. Historical experience seems
to indicate otherwise. It is clear, for example, that the distinctive
funding model of banking (or shadow banking) can exist and even
thrive without a public liquidity backstop. The United States
didn't have a lender of last resort until the creation of the Federal
Reserve in 1913, but banks have been around since the earliest
days of the republic. Similarly, it is far from obvious that the "bill
brokers" of nineteenth-century England-colorfully described by
Walter Bagehot in his masterpiece, Lombard Street19-were the
beneficiaries of any special government favoritism or facilitation.
But these proto-shadow banks created deposit substitutes on a
very large scale.
Fortunately, the case for full reserve banking does not stand
or fall on the question of affirmative governmental facilitation. If
the creation of deposit substitutes by nonbank entities is dangerous, why not just prohibit it outright? This strategy-restricting
entry into "money" creation-has been a core feature of bank regulation for centuries. Soon after the founding of the Bank of
England in 1694, Parliament forbade any other corporate entity
or large partnership in England from issuing bank notes. 20 In the
United States, analogous restrictions-called "restraining acts"-

16 Levitin, 83 U Chi L Rev at 389, 391-411 (cited in note 2).
17 Id at 390.
18 Id at 389.
19 Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market 281-300
(Scribner, Armstrong 1873).
20 Bank of England Act, 7 Anne, ch 30, § 66 (1708), in 9 Statutes of the Realm
113, 130.
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were established at the state level around the turn of the nineteenth century. 21 When Congress later sought to federalize money
creation by making national banks the exclusive issuers of bank
notes, it imposed a prohibitive tax on the issuance of bank notes
by state banks.22 Today, entry restriction remains at the core of
US bank regulation: it is axiomatic that no person or entity may
maintain "deposit" liabilities without a bank charter.23
Note that these prohibitions apply not to chartered banks,
but to everyone else. Entry restriction laws define the privilege
that a banking charter conveys. I have argued elsewhere that the
creation of deposit substitutes-shadow banking-stems from
banking law's failure to define, in functional terms, what constitutes a monetary instrument.24 Restricting entry into money creation means establishing a workable legal- institutional definition
of what types of instruments constitute "money." I see no reason
to think that this is any less feasible than defining "security" for
securities regulation purposes, or "swap" for derivatives regulation purposes, or "investment company" for investment company
regulation purposes, or "proprietary trading" for Volcker Rule
purposes, or . . the list could go on and on. These kinds of threshold definitional questions arise in pretty much every area of financial and economic regulation. There will always be some degree of regulatory arbitrage, but you don't need zero arbitrage to
be effective.
Of course, these two strategies-ending facilitation and establishing entry restriction-aren't mutually exclusive. It may
make sense to do both: a kind of belt-and-suspenders approach.
In any case, the crucial point here is that regulatory arbitrage
shouldn't be viewed as an insuperable obstacle to the effective
regulation of bank money creation. Unfortunately, full reserve
banking has another, deeper problem.
II. FISCAL-MONETARY ENTANGLEMENT
In a fractional reserve system, commercial banks create
money (deposit balances) to a multiple of their holdings of
government-issued base money. Suppose the government outlawed fractional reserve banking-thereby transitioning to a full
21 See Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America: From the Revolution to the
Civil War 184-85 (Princeton 1962).
22 See Act of March 3, 1865 § 6, 13 Stat 469, 484.
23 See 12 USC § 378(a)(2).
24 Morgan Ricks, The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation 230-37
(Chicago 2016).
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reserve system of the type Professor Levitin contemplates-while
holding constant the quantity of government-issued money. With
commercial banks no longer augmenting the money supply, the
total quantity of money would shrink drastically. The macroeconomic consequences could be severe.
The government (or an agency or instrumentality thereof)
might choose to offset this contraction with a corresponding expansion in government-issued money. Presumably it would get
this new base money into circulation by buying up government
debt securities, the traditional central banking practice. But what
if there isn't enough government debt outstanding to accommodate the desired increase in the money supply? As Professor
Fisher asked in his discussion of objections to full reserve banking: "If it should come to pass, some fine day, that the whole national debt had been paid off, what then?" 25
Naturally, the government could produce more debt to accommodate monetary expansion. This would mean cutting taxes
and/or increasing spending. Here the problem of fiscal-monetary
entanglement under full reserve banking begins to come into
view. In this world, fiscal expansion must precede monetary expansion. Monetary stimulus therefore becomes contingent upon
the resolution of contentious political questions. Who gets a tax
cut? What additional expenditures should the government undertake? For obvious reasons, such questions belong to political processes and are ill-suited to administrative delegation. Further, it
is not hard to imagine how political gamesmanship and gridlock
might come into play, frustrating monetary stabilization. Even
well-meaning legislators may not see eye to eye on the relative
merits of new "shovel ready" spending projects or on the incentive
effects of increased social welfare expenditure. And a policy of adjusting tax rates based on monetary policy considerations would
incentivize private actors to adjust their behavior so as to realize
taxable income in low-tax periods. There are ample reasons to
question whether this is a sensible way of doing money.
To be clear, the question here is not one of political accountability for monetary policy-an entirely separate issue. Rather, it
is a basic matter of policy execution. Is it wise to condition monetary expansion on fiscal adjustments? Some proponents of full reserve banking (and its close cousin, narrow banking) have recognized this problem. Professor Friedman favored 100 percent
reserve banking, but he had concerns about "the close connection

25

Fisher, 100% Money at 207 (cited in note 1).
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between the 100% reserve plan and debt management."26 If the
supply of government debt were exhausted, he wrote, then "[s]ubsequent increases in the stock of money" may require "the creation of additional debt to finance deficits"-an outcome he did not
find "particularly appealing."27 Along similar lines, Professor
Hyman Minsky noted that among the "institutional prerequisites" for a narrow banking system are "[a] large government debt
that can be monetized" and "[a] Federal Government fiscal posture which can readily be adapted" to accommodate the economy's
need for growing transaction account balances.28
I should emphasize that fiscal-monetary entanglement is not
merely hypothetical. In fact, it is a recurring theme of US monetary history, stretching back to colonial times. Colonial governments that relied on public expenditures to put new money into
circulation ran into problems when public expenses declined.
Some of them experimented with lending (rather than spending)
money into circulation through the device of "land banks"thereby sidestepping fiscal-monetary entanglement.29 In the next
century, the National Bank Acts of 186330 and 186431 forced national banks (which were bestowed with a monopoly on bank note
issuance) to collateralize their bank notes with US government
bonds.32 In the decades that followed, the supply of government
bonds proved insufficient to support an adequate supply of bank
notes. 33 Fiscal-monetary entanglement thus precluded monetary
elasticity; this difficulty turned out to be a major impetus behind
the Federal Reserve's creation in 1913.34 As recently as the turn
of the twenty-first century, with the federal government running
surpluses and paying down debt, the Federal Reserve was scrambling to figure out what to do if the supply of Treasuries could no
Friedman, A Programfor Monetary Stability at 71 (cited in note 1).
Id at 71 & n 11.
28 Hyman P. Minsky, Foreword, in Phillips, The Chicago Plan at xiii (cited in note
8). See also Robert E. Litan, What Should Banks Do? 169 (Brookings 1987) (suggesting
that narrow bank portfolios would ideally be limited to T-bills but acknowledging that "the
total supply of privately held short-term Treasury securities (with maturities up to one
year) is limited").
29 Christine Desan, From Blood to Profit: Making Money in the Practiceand Imagery
of EarlyAmerica, 20 J Pol Hist 26, 28-29 (2008).
30 National Bank Act of 1863, 12 Stat 665, superseded by the National Bank Act of
1864 § 62, 13 Stat 99, 118.
31 13 Stat 99, codified as amended at 12 USC § 21 et seq.
32 National Bank Act of 1863 § 15, 12 Stat at 669; National Bank Act of 1864 § 16,
13 Stat at 104.
33 See Alexander Dana Noyes, History of the National-Bank Currency 12 (GPO 1910).
34 Allan H. Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve: Volume I, 1931-1951 66
(Chicago 2003).
26
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longer support even the base money supply.35 A full reserve system would obviously magnify this problem severalfold-particularly once "shadow" monies (deposit substitutes) are suppressed.
Perhaps we should aim to design a monetary framework that
is compatible with a variety of fiscal environments. "There's something wrong with any monetary system that only works well if the
government acts as borrower of last resort," monetary economist
Professor Nick Rowe wrote recently.36 I am inclined to agree.
Fractional reserve banking offers an appealing escape from
fiscal-monetary entanglement. Banks create money (deposit balances) in the process of investing in not just government credit
but also consumer and business credit. The supply of private
credit investment opportunities is vast, far exceeding any conceivable desired money supply. In such a system, satisfying money
demand never depends upon fiscal adjustment. The system is
compatible with any fiscal environment, including a long-term
balanced budget. The advantages of decoupling monetary and fiscal affairs are substantial. Viewed through this lens, the deposit
banking system can be understood as a joint venture with the
state: a public-private partnership for the issuance and circulation of the money supply.
Fractional reserve banking need not be equated with the creation of private, defaultable, runnable "money." We know that
these things are logically separable. The establishment of US federal deposit insurance in 193337 put an end to the recurring panics
that had previously beset the chartered banking industry. This
was a revolutionary monetary transformation. In one fell swoop,
the bulk of the US money supply went from private to sovereign.
And this development inaugurated an unprecedented seventyfive-year period of panic-free conditions in the United States.38
Only with the emergence of shadow banking-the large-scale creation of deposit substitutes outside the insured banking systemdid instability return. 39 Whether the monetary liabilities of chartered banks are "private" or "sovereign," then, is a policy choice.

35
See generally Marvin Goodfriend, Policy Debates at the Federal Open Market
Committee: 1993-2002, in Michael D. Bordo and William Roberds, eds, The Origins, History, and Future of the Federal Reserve: A Return to Jekyll Island 332, 356
(Cambridge 2013).
36 Nick Rowe (Twitter, Apr 27, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/R6UM-9CW4.
37 See Banking Act of 1933 § 8, 48 Stat 162, 168-80.
38 Professor Gary Gorton refers to this as the "Quiet Period" in US banking. Gary B.
Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007 11 (Oxford 2010).
39 See generally id.
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Deposit insurance has plenty of critics, and its history is not
unblemished. The savings and loan debacle of the 1980s and early
1990s resulted in a $124 billion taxpayer bailout of the deposit
insurance system. 40 While costly, this failure needs to be kept in
perspective. First, it amounts to less than one-third of US military
expenditures in 1990.41 This is hardly an exorbitant fiscal price to
pay for seventy-five years of run-proof financial conditions. Second, much of this fiscal cost was avoidable, because regulation of
insured banking in the 1980s was awful. Among other things,
Congress relaxed bank and thrift portfolio constraints in the early
1980s, allowing insured institutions to dramatically increase
their exposures to risky asset classes like junk bonds and construction loans.42 Insured institutions then "gambl[ed] for resurrection," compounding the debacle.43 Third, and most important,
the savings and loan debacle was not accompanied by a severe
macroeconomic disaster. The United States entered a mild and
brief recession in July 1990. It is reasonable to conclude that, by
preventing a banking panic, deposit insurance forestalled a macroeconomic catastrophe. I concur with Warren Buffett, who recently opined, "I think the FDIC and Social Security were the two
most important things that came out of the '30s. I mean the system [ ] needed an FDIC."44
Levitin approvingly cites Professor James Tobin's view that
fractional reserve banking-the combination of monetary (deposit) liabilities and investment portfolios-is an "accident of history."45 The implicit claim is that the combination lacks a respectable justification. An alternative view would hold that existing
institutions of money and banking do embody an intelligible economic logic, and that the paramount task of monetary-financial

40 See Timothy Curry and Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis:
Truth and Consequences, 13:2 FDIC Banking Rev 26, 33 (2000).
41 See
1990
United
States
Budget
(InsideGov.com),
archived
at
http://perma.cc/L26W-J3F5.
42 See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
§§ 401-02, Pub L No 96-221, 94 Stat 132, 151-56; Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 §§ 321-30, 403, Pub L No 97-320, 96 Stat 1469, 1499-1502, 1510-11.
43 Jean-Charles Rochet, Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? The Politics and
Policy of Bank Regulation 86 (Princeton 2008).
44 FCIC Staff Audiotape of Interview with Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway
1:46:22-1:46:32, online at http://feic.law.stanford.edu/interviews/view/19 (visited Aug 26,
2016) (Perma archive unavailable).
45 Levitin, 83 U Chi L Rev at 369 (cited in note 2), quoting James Tobin, A Case for
PreservingRegulatory Distinctions, 30 Challenge 10, 14 (Nov/Dec 1987).
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reform is, or should be, to follow through on that logic.46 The principle of Chesterton's fence-don't dismantle a fence (or other institution) without a clear understanding of why it was erected in
the first place-is apposite here.47

CONCLUSION
Legal scholarship has been somewhat neglectful of money,
which is after all a legal institution. Payment law-one facet of
the law of money-has become something of a scholarly backwater, even in the eyes of its leading thinkers.48 Banking law scholarship has tended to focus on the "intermediation" function of
banking rather than its monetary function.49 The classic treatise
on the law of money, F.A. Mann's The Legal Aspect of Money, pursues by its own admission "a strictly legal approach" and is useful
primarily as a reference work.50 The international monetary order
has received attention from internationalist legal scholars, but
monetary systems are first and foremost domestic institutions.
Professor Rosa Maria Lastra's InternationalFinancialand Monetary Law5l is a formidable work of exposition and synthesis, but
it has few theoretical pretensions apart from the topic of monetary sovereignty.
There is room for deeper thinking in this field. Other legal
institutions of capitalism-property, contract, business organizations, securities, bankruptcy, antitrust, labor, and so forth-are
the subjects of vast legal literatures; each of these topics can claim
landmark contributions that give us ways to understand, impose
structure upon, and organize our thinking about these diverse
fields. By comparison, legal scholarship on monetary systems is
sparse.
This is starting to change. Professor Levitin's Safe Banking
joins a nascent surge in legal scholarship on monetary

46 I have argued as much at some length. See generally Ricks, The Money Problem
(cited in note 24).
47 G.K. Chesterton, The Thing 35 (S & W 1929).
48 See, for example, Joseph H. Sommer, Commentary: Where Is the Economic Analysis of Payment Law?, 83 Chi Kent L Rev 751, 766-67 (2008).
49 There are notable exceptions. See generally, for example, Hockett and Omarova,
The Finance Franchise (cited in note 15); Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow
Banking, 103 Va L Rev (forthcoming 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/W8YC-ZZCY.
50 F.A. Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money: With Special Reference to ComparativePrivate and PublicInternationalLaw ix (Oxford 5th ed 1992).
51 See generally Rosa Maria Lastra, InternationalFinancialand Monetary Law (Oxford 2d ed 2015).
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institutions-a surge that was largely, but by no means exclusively, precipitated by the global financial crisis of 2007 to 2009.
Some of that work, such as Professor Peter Conti-Brown's illuminating The Power and Independence of the FederalReserve, zooms
in on the central bank.52 Others have treated monetary institutions in a broader context. A major entry in this new literature is
Professor Christine Desan's astounding Making Money: Coin,
Currency, and the Coming of Capitalism, which traces the emergence and evolution of monetary institutions in medieval and
early modern England.53 Desan reveals monetary system design
to be an essential aspect of statecraft-a project of constitutional
dimensions, an act of institutional engineering with profound distributional implications. How monetary institutions are structured matters a great deal, and the choices that are inherent in
this project are often obscured from view. Levitin has done his
readers a service by inviting us to reexamine those choices.

52 See generally Peter Conti-Brown, The Power and Independence of the Federal Reserve (Princeton 2016).
53
See generally Christine Desan, Making Money: Coin, Currency, and the Coming
of Capitalism (Oxford 2014).
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